Anghami just printed its first full year of the combined Anghami-OSN+ business and the numbers tell a split-screen story: revenue grew 27% to $99.3 million and the user base cleared 130 million registered users with 3.5 million paid subscribers, but the operating loss widened to $87.4 million and the auditor explicitly flagged going-concern doubt. On June 30, 2026, controlling shareholder OSN Streaming Limited - which already owns roughly 67% of the equity - stepped in with a preliminary, non-binding going-private offer at $3.39 in cash per ordinary share, prompting the board to convene a special committee of three newly installed independent directors to evaluate the proposal. The stock is now a binary trade on the going-private process: holders either exit at the offer price, hold out for a higher bid, or wait for the special committee to walk away and the company to continue as a public, cash-burning, growth-stage streamer. The load-bearing risk is that the special committee concludes the $3.39 price is fair and minority shareholders are cashed out at a steep discount to the $8.00 stock high reached during 2025; the falsifiable clock is the formal committee response and any revised or rejected bid in the back half of 2026.
The thesis is that the going-private proposal has effectively placed a price ceiling on the equity at $3.39, and the equity is no longer being valued on operating fundamentals. We read this as a controlled-company exit attempt rather than a strategic acquisition at a premium: the offer sits roughly in the middle of the 2025 trading range of $2.32 to $8.00, well below the 52-week high and at only a modest premium to the most recent closing price. The market, in our view, is pricing a low probability of a topping bid from a third party and a high probability that the special committee ultimately recommends acceptance at or near $3.39, given the underlying business is loss-making, has burned $36 million of operating cash in 2025, carries a $20 million shareholder loan that funded the most recent liquidity gap, and depends on OSN itself for the HBO content library and the controlling-shareholder support letter that underwrites the going-concern qualification. The single most important catalyst is the special committee's fairness opinion, which is the only mechanism by which minority holders can be cashed out and which carries the potential to trigger either a topping-bid response or a definitive agreement at a defined price. We see three plausible paths from here: a topping bid from a strategic acquirer (low probability in our view given the controlled-company structure and the $89 million annual loss), acceptance of $3.39 in cash (base case), or rejection followed by continued public trading at a lower multiple (the path that requires a sharp improvement in 2026 unit economics that the FY2025 results do not yet support).
The next twelve months of news flow are dominated by the M&A process rather than operating performance, and the operating story itself remains structurally challenged. Content acquisition and royalty costs consumed $100.8 million of the $99.3 million of revenue in 2025, leaving the music-and-video subscription business with a 34% negative gross margin even before marketing and overhead, and the OSN+ video content commitments that drive that ratio are contracted and largely fixed. The only structural lever is subscriber growth against the 3.5 million base, with average revenue per user improving modestly from $2.12 to $2.16 over the year, and the December-launched Epic Bundle with Shahid and Disney+ positioned as the principal distribution expansion. The cash runway is functionally dependent on OSN's continuing support - the company ended 2025 with $22.3 million of cash against $87.8 million of total liabilities, $50.6 million of which is owed to related parties - and the April 2026 $20 million loan from UBC Ventures, which is owned by the same ultimate shareholder as OSN, was the bridge that kept the auditor's going-concern qualification from becoming a hard default. The single load-bearing risk to the going-private thesis is that the special committee concludes $3.39 is inadequate and the stock re-rates lower as a no-deal outcome; the single load-bearing upside is a topping bid, which the controlled-company structure makes structurally unlikely.